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"Virtue down the middle," said the Devil as he sat between two
lawyers.I
It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a
tort has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover
anything more. And it is equally difficult to understand why, if the
tortfeasor is to be punished by [punitive] damages, they should go to
the compensated sufferer ....
Charity is the most noble of virtues3 ....
he has it completely and perfectly.

[Ihf one has charity in this life,

I. INTRODUCTION
As the story goes, in 1986, a Philadelphia jury awarded $1 million to a
spiritual advisor" who claimed, in a medical malpractice case, to have lost her

1H.L. MENKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 668 (1966).
2

Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877).

3

SAINT THOMAs AQUINAS, ON CHARITY 81-82 (Lottie H. Kendzierski trans., 1960).
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4
psychic powers as a result of a negligently administered CAT scan. In another
of an
the
mother
case, a jury awarded $98.5 million in punitive damages to
enough
quickly
did
not
nurses
infant born a spastic quadriplegic because
diagnose complications in the delivery.5 In yet another case, a jury awarded a
man $124,573,750 in punitive damages in addition to $3,047,819 in
compensatory damages for the loss of his eye caused by a negligently
6
administered injection.
We have all heard the stories. Medical malpractice awards are like a recurring
dream with a bad theme: the system is out of whack.
More specifically, the common perception is that punitive damages in
medical malpractice claims contribute greatly to health care costs that have8
soared to crisis levels. 7 Regardless of whether these beliefs are well-founded,
concerns over punitive damages in medical malpractice claims have emerged
to the forefront of political debate and the national agenda in the past decade. 9
For example, while discussing rising health care costs, President Clinton noted
that "more people talk to me about their health care problems ... than anything
else."1 0 This support for tort reform formed the foundation of House
Republicans' Contract with America and the Common Sense Legal Standards
formed
Reform Act vetoed by President Clinton.1 1 A near-consensus has
12
among average citizens that our tort system needs serious reform.

4

The actual case was Haims v. Hart, #1981-4408, in the Philadelphia Court of

Common Pleas,

noted in NEIL VIDMAR,

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY

11 (1995). This casewas reported in several publications. See, e.g., PETER HuBER,GALILEO's
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 5 (1991); Sharon Begley, The Meaning of Junk,

NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1993, at 62; Liability Reform Is Coming, Editorial, WASH. POST, Apr.
1, 1986, at A18; Frederick N. Tulsky, Did Jury's Award ConsiderPsychic's Loss of Powers?
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 1986, at 9.
5MalpracticePlaintiffs Hit Big, HOSP.AND HEALTH NETWORKS, Mar. 5, 1996, at 14.
6

Procter v. Davis, 656 N.E.2d 23, 25 (Ill. App. 1994).

7

See Symposium, Constitutional Limitations on Tort Reform. Have the State Courts
Placed InsurmountableObstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses to the PerceivedLiability
Insurance Crisis?,32 VILL. L. REV. 1299 (1987).
8

Some commentators argue that the common perception is not well founded and
that current attitudes towards punitive damages are based on inaccurate or
unrepresentative anecdotal evidence. See VIDMAR, suipra note 4, at 11.
9

According to some commentators, "[tihe mid-1980's marked the emergence of the
liability crisis" that has continued to this day. W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born The National
Implications of Liability Reforms for General Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 1743,1743 (1994).

10 Transcriptof2nd TV DebateBetween Bush, Clinton and Perot,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,1992,
at All [hereinafter Transcriptof 2nd Television Debate].
11H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
12
Note, 'Common Sense' Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1765, 1765 (1996).
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What is not so clear is who to blame for these seemingly out-of-control
awards. All groups involved have received some criticism: doctors, 13 greedy
plaintiffs,14 the health care industry,15 judges,16 juries, 17 and lawyers. 18 Some
critics blame everyone equally.19 In a single column, one newspaper journalist
blamed plaintiffs who receive "windfall" awards; "overly sympathetic juries"
who grant "excessive awards;" "sharp lawyers" with "political clout" who think
"the sky is the limit;" the "incomprehensible logic of bureaucrats;" the "vagaries

13

See, e.g., ROBERT M. YOUNGSON & IAN SCHOTT, MEDICAL BLUNDERS (1996); MARTIN
FIDO & KAREN FiDo, THE WORLD'S WORST MEDICAL MISTAKES: AMAZING TRUE STORIES
ON MAD, BAD AND DANGEROUS DOCTORS (1996); Thomas Lundmark, Surgery by an
Unauthorized Surgeon as Battery, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 287 (1995-96); 13,012 Questionable
Doctors, HEALTH LETTER, Apr. 1996, at 1.
14Philip K. Howard, Judges and Courts Should Perform Justice, Not Theater, STAR
TRIBUNE, Apr. 16,1995, at 11A. "Anyone with the good fortune to have a misfortune can
get rich .... Even humdrum accidents result in feigned outrage and demands of $10
million or more." Id.
15

Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical
Malpractice:TargetingAmoral Corporations,Not "Moral Monsters" 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 975
(1995).
The 'Big Four'-hospitals, doctors, insurance companies, and drug
manufacturers-actively lobby to restrict punitive damages in medical
malpractice litigation. This 'medical-industrial complex' has great
political influence. Six-hundred and fifty groups spent more than $100
million from January 1993 to last March [1994] to influence the outcome
of health care legislation.
Id. at 980-81.
16

Keith N. Hylton, Rule 68, The Modified British Rule, and Civil Litigation Reform, 1
MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 73 (1996). "Our legislators could make considerably more
progress, at the state level, in discouraging frivolous litigation by raising the minimum
qualifications of judicial candidates." Id. at 74.
17

Bemadine Healy, Editorial, Legal Reform Won't Hurt Women, PLAIN DEALER, May
5, 1995, at lB.
Juries are asked to impose these damages on a purely subjective,
emotional basis. They are in excess of the amounts needed to pay
for the harm actually done. One juror [explained] her reasons for
awarding $10 million against a Washington D.C. doctor and
hospital: "I think it had something to do with sounding like
a round figure."
Id.; see also Peter Shuck, Mapping the Debate on ]ury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). But see VIDMAR, supra note 4 at 11
(arguing that juries have been used as "scapegoats" for the perceived problem).
18 See Helen Lippman, Why You Want Tort Reform, Bus. & HEALTH, Dec. 1995, at 34.
A recent survey indicated that ninety-six percent of respondents believe that medical
malpractice tort reform should include a limit on attorney fees. Id. See also, SKID MARKS:
COMMON JOKESABOUT COMMON LAWYERS (Michael Rafferty ed., 1988). "Everyone in my
family follows the medical profession," noted Smith. "They're lawyers." Id. at 52.
19

See, e.g., In Uneven Lawsuit System, Justice Gets Low Priority, USA TODAY, Dec. 18,
1996, at 12A [hereinafter Uneven Lawsuit System].
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of judges;" "powerful businesses" who get "special treatment;" lobbyists who
peddle influence; and the entire tort system that resembles a "lottery" for all
involved. 20
A continuum of responses has formed which addresses this perceived
problem. A small minority of voices claim that the current status of the medical
21
malpractice tort system functions adequately to address parties' needs.
According to one commentator, "the major malpractice problem continues to
be malpractice. "22 Indeed, some recent studies provide evidence that, contrary
to common perception, jury awards in medical malpractice cases are not
excessive. 23 Furthermore, judges often quietly reverse or reduce
well-publicized, seemingly excessive jury verdicts. 24 Other commentators
have conceded that jury awards in medical malpractice cases somewhat favor
plaintiffs but argue that the problem is not nearly as extreme as it has been
portrayed. 25 Some scholars have recognized that supporters and critics of
medical malpractice tort reform each have persuasive data supporting their
26
respective positions.
From the large majority of voices that call for change, reform proposals vary
greatly. Some claim that nearly any change would improve the current system
because soaring costs have stifled and deterred medical technology
advances. 27 Others advance reform because litigation costs become burden-

20

1d.

21

Matthew Kauffman, Legal Reforms May Have Limited Effect in State, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 10, 1995, at Al. Anthony Nuzzo, president of the Connecticut Defense
Lawyers Association says, "Number 1: There aren't any excessive awards, and 2: There
aren't many frivolous cases filed in the courts." Id.; see also, Julie Brienza, Punitive
DamagesAre Rare Independent Study Shows, TRIAL, Aug. 1996, at 14-15.
22

Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Defensive Medicine and Tort Reform: New Evidence in an

Old Bottle, 21 j. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 267 (1996).
23

See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awardsfor
Painand Suffering in Medical MalpracticeCases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217 (1993).
24

See Nathan Prater, Comment, Punitive Damages in Alabama: A Proposalfor Reform,
1014 (1995-1996).

26 CUMB. L. REV. 1005,
25

See, e.g., David Klingman et al., MeasuringDefensive Medicine Using Clinical Scenario
Surveys, 21 J. HEALTH POL. & L. 104 (1996). In this article, the authors analyze the effect
of large jury awards on physician practices. For a more thorough discussion of defensive
medicine and its accompanying costs to the health care system, see infra notes 92-96 and
accompanying text.
26

See Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the
True Purpose of PunitiveDamages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 485-90 (1993); see also Michele
M. Jochner, PunitiveDamages:The U.S. Supreme Court'sMeanderingPath, 83 ILL. B.J. 576,
577(1995).
27

Viscusi & Born, supra note 9 at 1744. Professor Viscusi and Ms. Born note that
vaccine production and contraceptive research "grounded to a halt" at the height of the
liability "crisis" in the mid 1980s. Id.
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some even in successful defenses against medical malpractice. 28 Others
advocate extreme measures. For example, in a slightly different context, one
29
popular writer, Peter Huber, advocates "lawyerectomy."
More reasoned voices call for judicial or legislative action. Some believe that
a major source of seemingly excessive awards is a weak-kneed judiciary 3 0 and
encourage active use of the remittitur power of judges. 31 Supporters of
legislative reform have for years advocated the British Rule of attorney
fee-shifting as a deterrent to filing frivolous lawsuits and as an incentive to
settlement before trial. 32 One interesting proposal that specifically addresses
rising health care costs and the accompanying burden on the poor is to extend
33
Good Samaritan acts to provide immunity to doctors treating indigents.
Two recent trends have emerged in medical malpractice legislative reform
in an effort to address these seemingly excessive awards. First, many states
have placed absolute caps on punitive damage recoveries. 34 Second, a growing
28

James F. McCarty, $6.25 Million MalpracticeAward in Death Overturned As Excessive,

PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 8, 1993, at lB. The Cleveland-area physician, Dr. Harry Figgie III,
complained, "People wonder why health-care costs are spiraling. It's from this kind of
claptrap that people drag us [physicians] through." Id.
29

Peter Huber, Rx: Radical Lawyerectomy, FORBES, Jan. 27, 1997, at 112. Huber asks,
"How do you trim $20 billion a year from Medicare?" His answer: "The easiest way:
amputate lawyers." Id. This author suspects that Mr. Huber would apply the same logic
to medical malpractice punitive damages tort reform.
30Hylton, supra note 16, at 74. Professor Hylton argues, "[i]f frivolous litigation is a
serious problem, it has more to do with the quality of decision-making in the judiciary
than with the incentives [to bring frivolous suits] provided by the existing procedural
rules." Id.
31
David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Inry Damages Assessments: A
Proposalforthe ComparativeAdditur/RemittiturReview of Awardsfor Nonpecuniary Harms
and PunitiveDamages, 80 IOWA L.REV. 1109 (1995). Remittitur is "the procedural process
by which an excessive verdict of the jury is reduced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 897 (6th
ed. 1991). A judge may condition a denied motion for a new trial on a plaintiff's
remittitur in a stated amount. FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (a).
32

See generally Hylton, supra note 16. Professor Hylton examines the comparative
incentives Federal Civil Rule 68 and a proposed "Modified British Rule" would produce.
33

Bridget A. Burke, Using Good SamaritanActs To Provide Access to Health Carefor the
Poor:A Modest Proposal,1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 139 (1992). Good Samaritan statutes create
immunity from civil liability for those who volunteer medical assistance to others in an
emergency situation. Id. at 140.
34

The following twenty-two states have enacted statutory caps on awards: ALASKA
STAT. § 09.17.010 (Michie 1992) ($500,000 limit for noneconomic damages in personal
injury actions, not including disfigurement or severe physical impairment); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3333.2 (West 1993) ($250,000 limit for noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1992) ($250,000 limit for
noneconomic damages generally, $500,000 limit for noneconomic damages when there
is clear and convincing evidence which justifies such a finding by the court); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-1603 (1992) ($400,000 limit for noneconomic damages in personal injury action); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (no punitive damages allowed in medical
malpractice cases); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1992) ($750,000 limit on all
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number of states have enacted split-award statutes,35 which place limits on the
percentage of punitive damages the plaintiff can recover, with the remaining
percentage passing to the state.
The purpose of this Note is not to answer the question of how excessive
medical malpractice and punitive damage awards are. Many highly respected
scholars on different sides of the issue have spent large portions of their careers
trying to resolve that issue without finding a common ground. This author does
not boldly claim to provide an answer in this limited forum.
This Note does, however, address a possible source of public frustration with
the state of medical malpractice and punitive damages: the lack of a principled
basis for the awards that juries give to the victims. The perception among many
average citizens is that all the parties involved-plaintiffs, lawyers, doctors,

damages recoverable for injuries in a medical malpractice action); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-340 (1986) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42.B(1) (West 1992) ($500,000 limit on all damages except
medical expenses); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 11-108 (1992) ($350,000 limit on
noneconomic damages in any action for personal injury); MAss GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231,
§ 60H (West 1992) ($500,000 limit for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
actions, not including wrongful death actions); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 600.1583 (1986)
($225,000 limit for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 538.210 (West 1992) ($350,000 limit for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1992) ($1,250,000 limit on all damages in medical
malpractice cases); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (1986) ($875,000 limit on
noneconomic damages for personal injury cases); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie
1992) ($500,000 limit on punitive damages in medical malpractice action); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.560(1) (1992) ($500,00 limit on damages arising from bodily injury); S.D. CODIFED
LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (Michie 1992) ($1,000,000 limit for all damages in medical
malpractice cases); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1987) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1992)
($1,000,000 limit for all damages in medical malpractice cases); W.VA. CODE § 55-73-8
(1992) ($1,000,000 for noneconomic loss in medical malpractice cases); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.55(4)(d) (West 1992) ($1,000,000 limit for noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-101 (Michie 1992) (damages for personal
injury limited to that recoverable under the wrongful death act).
In addition to those states above, the following three states previously had caps:
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 663-8.5, -8.7 (1991) ($375,000 limit for pain and suffering,
distinguished from other noneconomic damages of mental anguish, disfigurement, loss
of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, and other pecuniary losses or claims) (legislation
repealed effective Oct. 1, 1993); MINN. STAT. § 549.23 (1993) ($400,000 limit on
embarrassment, emotional distress, and loss of consortium) (legislation repealed
effective May, 4, 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (West 1992) ($1,000,000
variable cap on noneconomic damages for personal injury cases).
35

To date, nine states have enacted a "split award" statute. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-102 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)- (4) (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(e)(1)-(2) (1987); 110 ILL. REV. STAT. 2.1207 (1986); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668A.1(1)-(2) (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1988); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.675 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1989).
Additionally, three states are attempting to join the trend by enacting legislation to create
a split award statute. Texas, Indiana, and New Jersey all have bills pending.
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36
hospitals-try to get their proverbial piece of the pie. This Note demonstrates
that this perception of the medical malpractice tort system has some validity
because current treatment of punitive damages does not serve the goals of the
civil system. This Note also offers charitable donations of punitive damage
awards as an alternative to the current approaches. Unlike traditional
approaches to medical malpractice punitive damages, charitable donations of
punitive damages would not suffer from the same problems of excessive
compensation to the plaintiff, insufficient deterrent of the defendant, or the
constitutional problems associated with government claims on punitive
damages in split statute jurisdictions.
Part II of this Note discusses the common sense goals of compensation,
deterrence, and punishment that all areas of our legal system strive to
accomplish. 37 Part III of this Note shows how the current status of punitive
damages fails to meet these goals. 38 Specifically, Part III demonstrates that
allowing victims of medical malpractice to keep punitive damage awards
overcompensates plaintiffs, that placing caps on punitives underdeters
wrongful conduct, and that split statutes - while an improvement - suffer
from both of these problems to a lesser degree. Part IV offers charitable
donations as an alternative to these common approaches and shows how this
approach provides for appropriate punishment and deterrence of wrongful
acts, a principled amount of compensation to the victim, and the greatest
39
benefit for the greatest number of people.
As a final introductory note, the author offers this proposal for use in all areas
of punitive damages. Medical malpractice punitive damages have been chosen
as the focus of this Note because they have caused particular alarm in the past
several years. 4° This choice of focus in no way limits the number of other
contexts in which these principles may apply.

II. COMMON SENSE GOALS OF THE LAW
A common phenomenon in any area of problem-solving is to lose sight of
the larger objective when wading through the details. This trap is especially
pervasive when dealing with the law. Keeping this in mind, one must realize
that the goals of the law are both noble and straightforward: First, wrongs must
be compensated. Second, egregious wrongs must be punished and deterred.
These goals permeate all areas of the law.

36

See Uneven Lawsuit System, supra note 19. This scathing article seems to be fairly

representative of the common complaints of the medical malpractice tort system.
37

See infra notes 41-76 and accompanying text.

38

See infra notes 77-156 and accompanying text.

39

See infra notes 157-202 and accompanying text.

40

Rustad & Koenig, supra note 15, at 978. "Few topics in health care policy generate
more passion than punitive damage awards in medical malpractice cases." Id.
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A. Compensationof Wrongs
Although one need not devote extensive discussion to prove such seemingly
self-evident propositions, two examples will illustrate the concept of
compensation of wrongful acts. First, in contract law, a promisee of a breached
contract is ordinarily entitled to her "expectation interest," her "reliance
interest," or her "restitution interest." 41 The purpose of these remedies is to put
her in the same position she would have been had no breach occurred, had no
42
contract been made, or had she not conferred on the promissor any benefit.
Generally, when liquidated damages have been identified by the contract
terms, the promisee may not recover an amount that would exceed reasonable
compensation or that would function as punishment of the promissor.43 In
ordinary cases, punishment is not the goal of the law.
44
Second, in tort law, "the concern [is] with compensation for harm done."
The goal of tort law is "primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly
as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort." 45 The goal of tort law
mirrors the goal of contract law: compensation of wrongs. 46 One respected
authority has discussed the role of damages:
The primary aim in measuring damages is compensation, and this
contemplates that the damages for a tort should place the injured
person as nearly as possible in the condition he would have occupied
if the wrong had not occurred, and that the damages for breach of
in the position he would be in if the
contract should place the plaintiff
47
contract had been fulfilled.
Quite simply, the law strives to correct wrongful acts.

41

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 344 (1978).

42

1d. This rationale is standard language for many contract cases. See Ed Miller &

1

Sons Inc. v. Earl, 502 N.W.2d. 444, 450 (Neb. 1993) ("In a breach of contract case, the
ultimate objective of a damages award is to put the injured party in the same position
he or she would have occupied had the contract been performed, that is, to make the
injured party whole.").
43

356 (1) (1978).
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light
of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the
difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy as a penalty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

Id.
44PAGE KEETON & ROBERT E. KEETON, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2d ed. 1977).
45

46
47

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 901 cmt. a. (1979).

See Trotsky v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, Pittsburgh, 652 A.2d 813, 817 (Pa. 1995).
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES § 137 (1935).
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B. Punishment and Deterrence of Egregious Wrongs
Another purpose of the law is to punish and deter especially wrongful acts,
or "conduct which unjustifiably or inexcusably causes or threatens substantial
harm to individual or public interests."4 8 While this function of the law is most
obviously seen in the area of criminal law, the goals of punishment and
deterrence also form the basis of punitive damages in tort actions, 49 and to a
50
lesser degree, other areas of the law.
The criminal law provided the original justifications of retribution and
deterrence that have since spread to other areas of the law. Philosophers such
as Mill and Bentham saw the social utility and deterrent effect of punishment:
citizens would observe the punishment and would be deterred from
51
committing the wrongful act in the future.
Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man
perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted
upon in such a manner as tends, with a certain force, to withdraw him,
as it were, from the commission of that act .... The mischief which
would have ensued from the act, if performed, will . . . have been

prevented.

48

52

N.Y. REV. PENAL LAW§ 1.05 (McKinney 1996). See also MPC § 1.02 (West 1997).
(1) The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of
offenses are: (a) To forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and
inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or
public interests; (b) to subject to public control persons whose conduct
indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes.

Id.
49

KEETON & KEETON, sutpra note 44, at 1.

50

See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 686 P.2d
1158 (Cal. 1984) overruled by Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d
740 (Cal. 1995). In Seaman's, the California Supreme Court held that a party in breach
of contract may incur additional tort damages by denying in bad faith the existence of
a contract. 686 P.2d at 1168. Although Della Penna overruled Seaman's, a defendant
may nonetheless incur additional liability for a wrongful breach if the plaintiff proves
that the defendant committed some independent wrongful act in addition to the breach
of contract. These cases illustrate that, even ina seemingly straightforward contract case
that would not normall involve punishment or deterrence, these elements of tort and
criminal law can surface.
51 For an excellent overview of the utilitarian justification of punishment see JEFFRIE
G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 74-86 (1984). See also Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in J.
BENTHAM'S WORKS 367, 402 (JohnBowring ed. 1843).
52

Bentham, supra note 51, at 396.
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Other philosophers, such as Kant and Hegel, advocated the view that society
had a duty to punish wrongdoers. 5 3 Modem scholars have likewise stressed
the goal and utility of punishment. 54
Much like the criminal law, punitive damages in tort law have a long history
of punishment and deterrence of egregious wrongs. 55 As early as 2000 B.C. and
the Code of Hammurabi, punitive damages have existed. 56 Several forms of
multiple damage awards under Mosaic Law have Biblical references. 57 For
example, the Old Testament states, "if a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and
58
kill it, or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep."
Roman Law and English Common Law both utilized punitive damages when
the tort-feasor displayed malice when inflicting injury on the victim. 5 9 The 1784
case of Genay v. Norris6 0 is the first reported American case awarding punitive
61
damages.
The role of punitive damages in the civil system has endured to this day.
Congress has embraced punitive damages and has incorporated them into
various statutes. 6 2 Virtually every state legislature has passed statutes

53

IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 131 (W. Hastie trans., 1887).
But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice
takes as its principle and standard? It is the just principle of equality
... It may be rendered by saying that the undeserved evil which any
one commits on another is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself
.. This is the right of retaliation (jus talionis) ....
Id.; see also John Mackie, Retribution:A Test Casefor Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 677 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1991). "Annulment: This notion ... goes
back at least to Hegel .... Hegel's idea seems to be that as long as a criminal goes
scot-free, the crime itself still exists, still flourishes, but when the criminal is adequately
punished, the crime itself is somehow wiped out." Id.
54
See MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 238-243 (1984) (advocating the
retributivist view of giving "just deserts" for wrongs committed). For a discussion of the
justifications of punishment, see generally MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 51, at
113-131.
55
For an in-depth view of the role of punishment in the civil system see Bailey Kuklin,
Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1989). For
an extended view of the history of punitive damages see 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER &
KENNETH R. REDDEN, PuNrrrvE DAMAGES 3-17 (2d ed. 1989).
56

SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 55, at 3-4.

57

1d. at 4.

58

Exodus 22:1.

59

SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 55, at 5-7.

601 S.C.L. 6, 1 Bay 6 (1784).
61

See Jochner, supra note 26, at 577.

62

See, e.g., 18 U.s.c. 1964(c):
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of violation of section 1962 [RICO: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations] of this chapter may sue therefor [sic] in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
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providing for punitive damages when the wrongdoer has exhibited conduct
surpassing mere negligence, including medical malpractice claims.63 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the punitive damage award and
describes its purpose:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or
nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar
conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to
the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can
properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and
extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant
caused or intended
64
to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
The widespread support that punitive damages have had throughout
history reflects the moral force of its concept: especially harmful conduct must
be punished and prevented in the future. 65 Although occasionally
commentators have criticized the idea of allowing the plaintiff to keep the
67
punitive damages, 66 overall support for the concept has not wavered.
68
Only in relatively recent history have punitive damages been questioned.
Several factors have led to the recent criticism, not the least of which are the
seemingly outrageous medical malpractice awards plaintiffs have collected.
One might argue that the recent criticism of punitive damages has not

damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee ....
Id. This section provides for so-called "private citizen attorneys general." For further
discussion, see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
63

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B) (Banks-Baldwin 1996). A plaintiff may
recover punitive damages from a defendant if
(1) The actions or omissions of that defendant demonstrate malice,
aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression, or insult, or that defendant as principal or master authorized, participated in, or ratified
actions or omissions of an agent or servant that so demonstrate;
[and] (2) The plaintiff in question has adduced proof of actual
damages that resulted from actions or omissions [described above].
Id.
64RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
65

David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39

VILL. L. REV. 363, 375-80 (1994).
66

As early as 1852, the Supreme Court recognized the criticisms of punitive damage
payments to plaintiffs. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (13 How. 1852). "We are aware
that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers...." Id. at 371.
67

See SCI-ILUETER & REDDEN suipra note 55, at 24-25.

68

See Vidmar, supra note 23, at 218.
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originated from their failure to punish and deter egregious wrongs,69 but rather
from the overextension of another goal of the law: compensation of victims.70
In theory, the law stands upon common sense, 71 and it garners support when
72
it accomplishes its goals of compensation, punishment, and deterrence.
However, when the civil court system appears in many cases to reflect a
"litigation lottery,' 73 the
law no longer reflects the moral condemnation 74 or
"common conscience" 75 of the people. Current approaches to solving the
perceived punitive damages problem simply sacrifice one goal in favor of
another. Any real solution to excessive malpractice awards must incorporate
all of the common sense goals of the law.
III. CURRENT POLICY REGARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES DOES NOT
SERVE COMMON SENSE GOALS

At common law, the plaintiff recovered punitive damages for which the
defendant was liable. 7 6 In response to the perceived excessiveness of recent
77
medical malpractice awards, some legislatures have passed statutory caps;
others have passed split-award statutes that allocate punitive awards between
the plaintiff and the state.7 8 These approaches do not adequately accomplish
the common sense goals of compensation, punishment, and deterrence.

69

Biut see Peter A. Glassman et al., Physicians' PersonalMalpracticeExperiences Are Not
Related to Defensive Clinical Practices,21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 219 (1996).
70

1d.

71

See McCann, M.D. v. Lee, 679 So. 2d 658 (Ala. 1996). Judges have a duty to use
common sense when analyzing the law. Id.
72

The law represents "the nature and limits of power which can legitimately be
exercised by society over the individual." J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 70 (David Spitz ed., 1975)When the law fails to accomplish the goals of compensation, retribution and deterrence,
it exceeds the limits of its power. Id.
73

Rachel Kreier, Playing the Liability Lottery, Am. MED. NEWS, Apr. 15, 1996, at 7-8.

74

SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULLHOFERCRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
104-05 (6th ed. 1995). "Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation
of wrong doing, and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the
punishment . . . should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of
citizens for them." Id. (citing ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 207 (Denning
ed., 1949)).
75

See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIvISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108-09 (Simpson trans., 1964).
According to Durkheim, punishment must reflect the "common conscience," the moral
conscience," or the "collective sentiment" of the community. Id.
7

6
Bailey Kuklin, Punishment:The Civil Perspectiveof Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1989).
77

See statutes cited supra note 34.

78

See statues cited supra note 35.
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A. Plaintiffs Recovery of Punitive Damages

The common law approach toward punitive damages receives the most
criticism, perhaps because newer treatments of punitive damages have yet to
manifest their deficiencies. Critics of the common law approach often cite
resulting problems of overcompensation of the plaintiff, attacks on the
credibility of the civil justice system, overdeterrence of health care providers,
and the lack of a rational justification for allowing the plaintiff to keep the entire
punitive award. The following text addresses each criticism.
Allowing a plaintiff to recover punitive damages overcompensates the loss
attributable to his injuries. For example, in Schaefer v. Miller79 an
ophthalmologist removed the plaintiff's cataract without obtaining informed
consent and failed to properly treat her eye after it had developed an
infection. 80 The jury awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages to the
plaintiff and $750,000 in punitive damages. 8 1 The jury based the large punitive
award on evidence indicating that Dr. Miller forged several other patients'
consent forms in addition to the plaintiff's. 82 The prior forgeries in no way
diminished or enlarged plaintiff's injuries in this case, but the jury awarded her
$1.1 million in large part on other patients' misfortune. 83 Had the plaintiff
suffered the same injury without the 'benefit" of having the doctor commit
egregious wrongs against others, the plaintiff undoubtedly would have
received less or no punitive damages. Precisely this type of capitalization on
the medical misfortunes of others leads to the perception that punitive
damages overcompensate plaintiffs. 84

79587 A.2d 491 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).
80Id. at 494-95.
81
82

d. at 495.
d. at 494-95.

83

A recent non-medical case illustrates this problem. See BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct.
1589 (1996). This is the so-called "$2 million paint job case." Lippman, supra note 18, at
34. In Gore, the jury awarded plaintiff $4,000 for the damage to his own car and
$4,000,000 in punitive damages for the damage done to 1000 otherpurchasers' cars. Gore,
116 S. Ct. at 1593. Not only did the jury award plaintiff a windfall, but awarded it at the
expense of other purchasers' misfortune. The Alabama Supreme Court adjusted the
punitive award to $2 million, and the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded. Id. See infra notes 137-156 and accompanying text for a discussion of excessive
fines challenges.
84
Supporters of this type of punitive damage award would undoubtedly argue that
each plaintiff has a right to sue for punitive damages based on the doctor's conduct, not
other patients' injuries. Courts may grant multiple awards for punitive damages.
This ignores the reality that juries will not award large punitive damages without
accompanying injury to third parties despite whatever degree of egregious conduct in
which the physician engages. Indeed, the award of punitive damages may be at the
expense of the other victims. First, because punitive damages often depend upon the
suffering of third persons, punitive damages are at the expense of others. Second,
because a defendant may notbe able to pay punitive damages to more than one plaintiff,
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Allowing the plaintiff to keep punitive damages also creates the perception
of excessive awards and undermines the credibility of the justice system that
allows such86awards. 85 Common perception is that the plaintiff simply gets an
"excessive" amount, or a "windfall.' 87 Courts have occasionally echoed this
same thought. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist, one of the more vocal
critics of plaintiff recovery of punitive damages, argued:
Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who
are entitled to receive full compensation for their injuries-but not
more. Even assuming that a punitive "fine" should be imposed after a
civil trial, the penalty should go to the State, not the plaintiff-who by
hypothesis is fully compensated. 88
More often, courts have not echoed this thought. For example, in TXO
ProductionCorp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,89 the Supreme Court held that a $10
million punitive damage award to a plaintiff who had incurred $19,000 in
actual damages was not excessive. 90
Allowing plaintiffs to keep punitive damage awards also causes
overdeterrence. 9 1 Critics of the common law approach argue that doctors
practice defensive medicine in response to perceived excessive punitive
damage awards. 92 Duke University researchers described defensive medicine

the punitive damage award may be at the expense of third parties.
85

See Uneven Lawsuit System, supra note 19; see also SKID MARKS, supra note 18, at 26:
A lawyer had a jury trial in a very difficult business case. The client
who had attended the trial was out of town at the time the jury came
back with its decision. The decision was a complete victory for the
lawyer and his client. The lawyer excitedly sent a telegram to the client,
which read, simply:
"Justice has triumphed!"
The client, a realistic man, received the telegram and wired back:
"Appeal at once!"

86

0ne concerned reader, seeking the "Advice of Counsel," the name of the column,
asked: "I read about the size of some punitive damage awards and shake my head
because they seem so excessive. When can punitive awards be assessed in cases of
nursing malpractice, and do malpractice insurers cover these damages?" Donna Lee
Mantel, R.N., Advice of Counsel, RN, Sept. 16, 1996, at 67.
87

Sloane, supra note 26, at 475.

88

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89509 U.S. 443 (1993).
90

1d.

91

See James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Avay from the
Plaintiff:An Analysis, 86 N.W.U.L. REv. 1130, 1130 (1992).
92
See Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors PracticeDefensive Medicine?, 111
Q.J. ECON. 353 (1996). In answering their own question in the affirmative, Kessler and
McClellan conclude that initial medical malpractice tort reforms reduced defensive
medicine costs by five percent to nine percent without adversely affecting medical care.
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as occurring "when physicians order tests procedures or visits, or avoid
high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to
"93
reduce their exposure to malpractice liability.
Like ordinary citizens, doctors hear the sensationalized stories of outrageous
punitive damage awards and, quite naturally, attempt to avoid any appearance
of malpractice. Two methods of avoiding liability exist: prescribing every
treatment that has any possibility of marginal benefit,9 4 or avoiding any
treatment that poses any significant risk. 95 The Duke University researchers
noted this same distinction: "When physicians perform tests or procedures
primarily to reduce exposure to liability, they are practicing positive defensive
medicine. When they avoid certain patients or procedures, they are practicing
negative defensive medicine.' 96 Both forms of defensive medicine are extremely
expensive to the consumer, either in terms of much higher insurance
premiums 9 7 or in terms of reduced access to higher-risk health care treatment. 98
In addition to these tremendous costs, allowing plaintiffs to keep punitive
damages lacks a principled justification. The dwindling number of supporters
of the common law approach offer several theories of justification. All fail.

93
See Klingman et. al., supra note 25, at 188-89. In this clinical scenario survey, the
authors measured the costs to consumers in terms of added expense for unnecessary
routine procedures and in terms of poorer health caused by unperformed procedures
due to the risk involved.
94

See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson & C. John Rosenquist, The Use of Low-Osmolar Contrast
Agents: Technological Change and Defensive Medicine, 21 J. HEALTH POL. & L. 243 (1996).
Jacobson and Rosenquist conclude that, although physicians are primarily concerned
for the patient's health, the use of technologically-newer and substantially more
expensive low osmolar contrast agents results in part from liability concerns. Id. Doctors
widely use the new technology despite the statistically insignificant health advantage
at costs upwards of twenty times the older method. Id. at 244-45.
95

"The most frequently cited examples of negative defensive medicine are decisions
by family practitioners and even some obstetrician-gynecologists to stop providing
obstetric services." Klingman et. al., supranote 25, at 189 n.2. See Healy, supranote 17, at
11B. "Some products used exclusively for women-namely those for pregnancy and
contraception-are particularly susceptible to withdrawal by companies fearing
lawsuits." Some commentators argue that proposed medical malpractice punitive
damage reform has potential for bias against women. See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael
Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1; Lisa
Ruda, Note, Caps on Non-Economic Damages and the Female Plaintiff:Heeding the Warning
Signs, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 197 (1993).
96
See Viscusi & Born, supra note 9; Jacobson & Rosenquist, supra note 94; see also
Geoffry Cowley, Beyond the Mammogram, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1997, at 59. Cowley
discusses new digital testing technologies that cost roughly three times as much as
conventional mammograms. No evidence shows that the new method detects more
tumors than the old, but proponents believe eventually the new technique will justify
the cost.
97

See Viscusi & Born, supra note 9.

98

See Klingman et al., supra note 25.
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First, supporters of the traditional approach often claim that the plaintiff
should keep punitive damages because she has suffered an egregious wrong
that affects her health. 99 A victim of an extra-harsh wrong will often deserve a
greater award, but this is true only when she has suffered greater injury.100 If
the victim has suffered greater injury due to the malice of the health care
provider, the law should to make the plaintiff whole through direct
compensatory damages. 101 To say that the victim has suffered greater injury is
not an answer to why she should recover punitive damages. 102
Second, supporters of the traditional approach often claim that the plaintiff
should receive punitive damages as compensation for his services as a private
attorney general. 103 Without any compensation, plaintiffs would not pursue
punitive damages and society would not benefit from the better health care
that results from punishment of harmful doctors.1 04 Public policy favors
compensation of plaintiffs as an incentive to bring punitive damage suits
against egregious wrongdoers, but limitless recovery of punitive damages
provides more incentive than is necessary to ensure that society benefits from
punishment of harmful medical treatment. Allowing plaintiffs to keep entire
punitive damage awards overcompensates and creates too large an incentive
105
to seek punitive damages.
Third, supporters of the traditional approach often claim that punitive
damages should be awarded to the plaintiff as payment for attorney's fees, 106
and some courts still subscribe to this rationale. For example, in Markey v.
Santangelo,107 the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that "punitive damages
consist of a reasonable expense properly incurred in the litigation."' 08
However, much like the justification of compensation for providing a public
service, 109 this rationale goes too far in providing an incentive for the plaintiff
to bring suit. While it is true that public policy justifies rewarding plaintiffs for
bringing suit against egregious wrongdoers, 110 awarding the plaintiffs the
entire punitive damage amount is unnecessary and counterproductive. If
99

See Prater, supra note 24, at 1034-35.

100 See MCCORMICK, supra note 47.
101

Breslo, supra note 91, at 1137-39.

02

1 Owen, supra note 65, at 384-96.
103Prater, supranote 24, at 1033-34.
104
Sloane, supra note 26, at 480-81.
105

Breslo, supra note 91, at 1133.
Prater, supranote 24, at 1035. See also Breslo, supra note 91, at 1136-37.
107485 A.2d 1305 (Conn. 1985).
106

1081d. at 1308 (citations omitted).
109 See Prater, supra note 24.
110

See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
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payment of attorney fees were the true reason for awarding the plaintiff entire
punitive damage awards, then no rational basis would exist for allowing the
plaintiff's recovery to exceed his litigation costs and his compensatory damage
award. To award the plaintiff litigation costs is not an answer to why he should
keep entire punitive damage awards.
111

B. Statutory Caps

Knee-jerk reaction to seemingly excessive malpractice awards knows no
color or social class. This country's highest-ranking leaders exhibit the same
frustrations as average citizens. For example, President Bush explained that
one thing to blame is these malpractice lawsuits. They are breaking the
system. It costs 20 to 25 billion dollars a year and I want to see those
outrageous claims capped. Doctors don't dare deliver babies
sometimes because they're afraid that somebody's going to sue them.
People don't dare-medical practitioners-to help somebody along
the highway that are hurt [sic], because they're afraid that some
lawyer's going to come along and get a big lawsuit. 112
Both major political parties have attempted to tackle the perceived problem
of runaway health care costs. President Clinton promised "universal health care
coverage,"113 but failed to implement his plan early in his first term. Despite
sweeping Congressional gains in 1994, Republican health care proposals have
also stalled. States have passed statutory caps in the absence of federal
114
legislation.
The impetus behind the statutory caps was the perceived excessiveness of
the punitive awards and their adverse ramifications. Unfortunately, caps on
punitive damages have an immense unintended consequence: subversion of
115
the goals of retribution and deterrence.
Placing caps on punitive awards despite the egregiousness of conduct and
wealth of the defendant is arbitrary. The result of any arbitrarily picked amount
is that its full effect will not reach the defendants most able to bear these costs. 116
Current standards for awarding punitive damages incorporate "[t]he amount
of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in the

111

See statutes cited supra note 34.
112Transcriptof the 2nd Televised Debate, supra note 10.
1 13
Adam Clymer, The Health Care Debate: The Overview; National Health Program,
President'sGreatestGoalDeclaredDead in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, September 27, 1994, at Al.
1 14

See statutes cited supra note 34.

115

See Note, 'Common Sense' Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1765, 1774 (1996). "Tothe extent that punitive damages currently correct for the
tort system's inability to hold all tort-feasors accountable, a cap may result in
underdeterrence." Id.
116

See Stephen G. Good, Defending Against Punitives, 21 No.2 Litigation 29, 64 (1995).
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light of the defendant's financial situation. 117 Caps, however, prevent
imposition of punitive damages on especially wealthy or especially egregious
wrongdoers necessary to sufficiently punish or adequately deter wrongful
conduct. 118 A commentator describing a famous case in a non-medical context
provides a striking example of the problem:
Of course, what is a 'huge' punitive award is relative to the wealth of
the defendant. An attorney representing the plaintiffs in the Exxon
Valdez case described the plaintiffs' punitive damage claim of $15
billion as a 'hiccup' for an oil company the size of Exxon. Perhaps in
at (in private) by some
the future, this amount will be scoffed
119
mega-defendant as a mere pittance.
Furthermore, as defendants become aware of the upper limit of their
potential liability, arbitrarily capped punitive damage costs become fixed and
predictable. 120 According to one commentator,
[u]ncertainty as to the amount of the punitive damage award is
desirable because it prevents defendants, particularly corporations,
from engaging in cost-benefit analyses that affect their conduct.
•.. In a "cap" state, a corporation has the ability to estimate how many
potential lawsuits will be brought in connection with the defect, then
can calculate with precision what the cost of not fixing the defect will
be. Essentially this allows the corporation
121 to reduce the concern for
societal safety to an issue of economics.
Statutory caps on punitive damages simply shift the incentive for abuse from
the plaintiffs who seek a "litigation lottery"122 to "amoral corporations"'123 who
seek to gain a profit, even through egregious practices.

117 Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Civil, of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, California, California Jury Instructions § 14.71 (West 1997).
118See Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative
Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345 (1995).
119

Good, supra note 116, at 64.

120

See Sloane, supra note 26, at 484 n.60.

121Id.
122

See Kreier, supra note 73.

123

See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 15.
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C. Split Awards

124

In response to the perceived problem of excessive punitive awards, some
states have enacted split statutes that attempt to retain the deterrent effect while
reducing, without eliminating, the plaintiff's incentive to pursue punitive
damages.' 25 Split statutes allow the plaintiff to pursue punitive damages, but
retain only a portion of the award. 126 The states' general funds typically retain
the balance of the award, but some states earmark the awards for the specific
governmental agency best able to prevent the wrongful conduct.1 27 For

example, Kansas requires placement of state recovery of punitive damages in
a health care stabilization fund. 128 The statutes vary with regard to the
percentage that the state and plaintiff each receive. For example, in Georgia,
plaintiffs must remit seventy-five percent of punitive damage awards to the
state; 129 in Colorado, the plaintiff need only remit one-third of the punitive
130
award to the state.
Public policy favors payment to a plaintiff who brings a punitive damage
suit against an egregious wrongdoer. A sound basis exists for allowing the
plaintiff to keep more than compensatory damages. The traditional approach
rewards this public service by allowing the plaintiff to keep the entire punitive
damage award. Perceived as abused by plaintiffs, recent reform included caps
on punitive damages and split statutes.
Proponents argue that split statutes provide compensation, retribution and
deterrence, and avoid overcompensation and overdeterrence. They argue that
split statutes fully punish and fully deter egregious conduct while they reduce
the incentive to seek punitive damages by allowing the plaintiff to keep only a
relatively small percentage of the award. Indeed, even the most generous split
statute jurisdictions require the plaintiff to forfeit a third of his punitive award.
Some jurisdictions require forfeiture of three-fourths of the plaintiff's punitive
award.
Supporters offer an additional basis for support: by awarding the state with
a large percentage of the punitive damage award, future victims of malpractice
might benefit from this award, not just the lone plaintiff. For example, the state
might apply the portion of the punitive damage award it keeps to support the
Medical Licensing Board under the theory that more people in the future will
benefit from a fully-funded, adequately-staffed Licensing Board that does a
more thorough job of investigating doctor malpractice.

12 4

See

statutes cited supra note 35.

25

1 See Sloane supra note 26, at 478.
126
1d.
127ld.
128

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (e) (1988).

129

GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e)(1)-(2) (1987).

1

30

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (4) (West 1996).
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Although split awards are an improvement to the traditional approach to
punitive damages, this approach is an inadequate solution. Split awards
enlarge government and face constitutional complications.
First, retention by the state of any portion of punitive damage awards flies
in the face of current bipartisan support for smaller government.
Conservatives, who made great gains in 1994 in both the federal and state
legislatures, 13 1 have held as a pillar of their ideology the concept of
"devolution."132 Lawmakers on both the state and federal level, who came into
office on the wave of the Contract with America theme, seemed to hold dear
133
the words of President Reagan who said that "[g]overnment is the problem."
Democratic leadership took hold of this same theme, as President Clinton made
similar proclamations: "The era of big government is over,"134 and "government
must do more with less."135
In this context, the growing support for split statutes illustrates the perceived
magnitude of the medical malpractice punitive damage awards. That nine state
legislatures in this era of smaller government have appropriated for state use
anywhere between one-half and two-thirds of the billions of dollars in punitive
damages awarded each year is quite remarkable. Even more remarkable is the
widespread public support this appropriation has received. For many, support
for split statutes exist only by default, a lesser of two evils: enlargement of
136
government over "millionaire-through-injury syndrome."'
Retention by the state of any portion of punitive damages poses
constitutional problems. 137 In the past several years, the Supreme Court has
heard a series of cases involving the constitutionality of certain punitive
damage awards and statutes. 138 The issues involved double jeopardy, excessive
fines, equal protection, self-incrimination, and due process. 139 Critics have
argued that this line of decisions raises more questions than answers to many

131 David Broder, A Historic Republican Triumph: GOP Captures Congress; Sharp Turn
To Right Reflects Doubts About Clinton, Democrats, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at Al.
Republicans gained a majority in the House and Senate for the first time in forty years.
The Republicans also gained control of seven of the eight largest state capitals. Id.
132Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?,
14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 429, 430 (1996).
133 Lou Cannon, Inaugural Address: Evocative Version of Campaign Message; The
Inaugural Address: Enunciatinga Basic Creed, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1981, at A29.
134

Alison Mitchell, State of the Union: The Overview: Clinton Offers Challenge to Nation,
Declaring, 'Era of Big Government is Over,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan 24, 1996, at Al.
135Perry Willis, Clinton's "Smaller Govt.," Will Cost $800 Billion, PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN PRESS MATERIALS, Jan. 20, 1997.

136 Howard, supra note 14.
137 Sloane, supra note 26, at 494.
138 Jochner, supra note 26, at 576.
139 Breslo, supra note 91, at 1131-33.
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of these issues. 140 Justice Scalia complained in Pacific Mutual Life Insurancev.
Haslip141 that the Court had "perpetuate[d] the uncertainty that our grant of
certiorari in this case was intended to resolve."142 At best, the Court has not
settled many issues that involve punitive damages in the civil system.
One of the few issues that the Court apparently had settled, has re-emerged
as a potential problem in light of recent split statutes giving the state an interest
in civil awards. Since Browning-FerrisIndusutries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.,143 defendants had ceased challenging punitive damages on excessive fines
grounds. 144 Browning-Ferrishad stood as a definitive statement that the Court
would not interfere with a plaintiff's recovery of punitive damage awards on
excessive fines grounds. However, three decisions after Browning-Ferrishave
put the status of split statutes in doubt.
In Browning-Ferris,the Court noted that the Excessive Fines Clause had been
"appl[ied] primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and
punishments. 145 The Court reasoned that "the primary focus of the Eighth
Amendment was the potential for governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial'
power, not concern with the extent or purposes of civil damages."146 The Court
held that the Eighth Amendment "does not constrain an award of money
damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action
nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded."147 Because the state
traditionally did not have any claim on the punitive damage award, the
defendant could not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause.
The Court reassessed the civil-criminal distinction four years later in Austin
v. United States.148 The United States initiated forfeiture proceedings against
Mr. Austin's body shop and mobile home after his conviction for cocaine
possession on those properties. 149 Austin claimed that the forfeiture
proceedings violated the Excessive Fines Clause. The government argued that
the forfeiture did not constitute a punishment because it protected the public
from future drug trade and acted as compensation for expense incurred in

140Jochner, supra note 26, at 576.
141499 U.S. 1 (1991).
1421d. at 24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143492 U.S. 257 (1989).
144U.S.CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Id.
145 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262.
146

!d. at 266.

147

1d. at 263-64 (emphasis added).

148509 U.S. 602 (1993).
149

The government initiated proceedings pursuant to 21 u.s.c. §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7)

(1988). Id.
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enforcement of the drug laws. 150 The Court rejected the government's
argument and held that a forfeiture to the government constitutes a
punishment. 15 1 Significantly, the Court failed to strictly limit the holding to
criminal forfeitures and left open the door that Browning-Ferris initially
appeared to close.
In addition to Austin, the decisions in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg152 and BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore153 puts plaintiffs who seek punitive damages on
notice that the Court's pendulum has swung in defendants' favor. Although
the Court did not decide Gore and Oberg on excessive fines grounds, their
holdings indicate a greatly increased amenability to the invalidation of
punitive damages. The Oberg decision represented the first punitive damage
award struck down by the Supreme Court. The defendant successfully argued
that a unique state statute prohibiting judicial review of a five million dollar
punitive damage award violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights. Initial reaction to the decision downplayed its significance and
attributed the result as a reaction to the unconventional statute. 154
The Gore decision, however, provides strong evidence that the Obergdecision
was not an aberration. In Gore, the Supreme Court ruled that a two million
dollar punitive damage award for BMW's failure to disclose minor damage
and repairs prior to sale of new cars impermissibly exceeded the $4000 in actual
damage caused to the plaintiff. The Court held that such "grossly excessive"
awards violated the car manufacturer's due process rights. Again, while the
decision did not rest on excessive fines grounds, Gore represents the Court's
newfound antagonism towards punitive damage awards.
State recovery of a portion of the award in split-statute states will not help
to remove this distaste for punitive damage awards. With the enactment of split
statutes in nine states 155 and the Supreme Court decisions in Austin, Oberg, and
Gore, the Excessive Fines Clause has re-emerged as a potential obstacle to
treatment of punitive damages.

15OId. The government pointed to a previous holding in United States v. One

Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), as support for the proposition that the
government may seize property connected with illegal or harmful activity in order to
protect the public. Id. at 621. The Court, however, narrowly interpreted 89 Firearms. Id.
15 11d. at 622.
152512 U.S. 415 (1994).
153116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
154 Jochner, supra note 26, at 582-83.
155

See statutes cited supra note 35.
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IV. CHARITABLE DONATIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE THAT WOULD SERVE
THE GOALS OF OUR CIVIL SYSTEM

This Note demonstrated in Part II that the common abuse goals of the civil
system include compensation, punishment, and deterrence. 156 Part III of this
Note noted that the current methods of dealing with the perceived problems
of excessive punitive damages fail to reach these goals. 157 This part offers
charitable donations as a method that would accomplish those goals.
Punitive damages pose a dilemma for reformers because a balance between
competing interests is difficult to strike. The traditional approach tends to
overcompensate the plaintiff and overdeter health care providers. 158 One
possible solution, statutory caps, addresses the problem of overcompensation,
but the unintended result is underdeterrence of egregious conduct. 159 Another
possible solution, split statutes, somewhat addresses the problem of
underdeterrence of egregious wrongdoing and approximates proper
160
compensation, but enlarges government and faces constitutional problems.
One alternative that lawmakers have not utilized provides a viable solution
to the punitive damages riddle: charitable donations of punitive damages. This
alternative offers the appropriate amount of incentive for the plaintiff to pursue
punitive damages, provides the appropriate amount of punishment and
deterrence of egregious conduct, avoids political reservations and
constitutional concerns associated with state interests attaching to punitive
awards, and produces benefits for the community that common approaches to
punitive damages cannot possibly achieve.
A. The Proposal
The proposed charitable donation alternative consists of a relatively simple
framework, consisting of four rules:
1. A jury shall assess punitive damages against defendants
whom the plaintiff proves acted maliciously or egregiously.
2. The degree of egregiousness and the amount of penalty
sufficient to punish and deter repeated wrongful acts shall
function as the only limit to the amount of the assessment. The
jury should consider the wealth of the health care provider at
fault.
3. As an incentive to pursue punitive damages and as
compensation for performing a public service, the plaintiff
shall receive one-third of the punitive damage award.

156

See stipra notes 41-75 and accompanying text.

157

See supra notes 76-153 and accompanying text.

158

See supra notes 79-110 and accompanying text.

159

See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
160See supra notes 122-53 and accompanying text.
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4. The plaintiff, with court approval, shall designate the recipient
of the remainder of the award. The recipient must use the
funds to assist current or future victims of similar egregious
misconduct.
Each rule requires brief comment.
The first rule intends to adopt the current standard for imposing punitive
damages. Keeping in line with the goals of the civil system, this approach aims
to subject wrongdoers to liability that exceeds compensatory liability only
when the health care provider has committed an egregious wrong.
The second rule completely repudiates any notion of arbitrarily limited
punitive liability and is fully consistent with traditional common law. This rule
envisions punitive damages commensurate with the wrongful health care
provider's ability to pay. For example, the rule does not limit the punitive
liability of a pharmaceutical company to $250,000 when proper punishment
and deterrence require a ten million dollar award. Average citizens appear to
have little sympathy for those health care providers who are driven purely for
profit. 161 Recent attacks on the rich and corporate America, 162 specifically in
the health care industry, suggest that this rule would enjoy wide support.
The third rule recognizes compensation for public services rendered as the
true reason for allowing plaintiffs to recover an amount above compensatory
damages. The state has an interest in creating an incentive to pursue punitive
damage claims. The state also has an interest in realistically limiting that
incentive.
The allocation of one-third of the punitive damage award for the plaintiff
represents the standard retainer fee for attorneys. In essence, the plaintiff acts
as a private attorney general when she pursues punitive damages against
egregious wrongdoers. She provides a service to society by gaining a judgment
and punishing and deterring future medical misconduct. Her compensation
for this service increases as she punishes and deters more egregious and more
harmful conduct. The rule places a limit on the percentage of punitive damages
that the plaintiff can recover, but such a limit will not unduly deter pursuit of
punitive damages. More importantly, the defendant does not enjoy an upper
limit above which that health care provider will not be liable.
Finally, the fourth rule provides for the public benefit of the egregious
wrongdoing. The rule gives the victim who has suffered egregious wrongdoing
the opportunity to decide how current and future victims of the same type of
wrongdoing might best benefit from the punitive damages. The rule limits the
use of the funds and includes a check on abuse of this privilege by requiring
judicial approval of proposed donations.
161

See Kenneth Labich, How To Fire People and Still Sleep at Night, FORTUNE, June 10,

1996, at 65; David C. Band & Charles M. Tustin, StrategicDownsizing, 33 MANAGEMENT
DECISION 36 (1995). Articles such as these will not improve corporate America's
reputation for greed.
162

Shira McCarthy, Downsizing Era Continues as AT&T Gives 40,000 the Boot,
Jan. 8, 1996, at 8.
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B. The Benefits of CharitableDonations

Charitable donations of a significant portion of the punitve damages award
present a variety of advantages: adequate compensation of the victim,
sufficient punishment and deterrence of an egregious wrongdoer, prevention
of windfall awards to plaintiffs, reduction of the currently over-inflated
incentive to pursue punitive damages, political appeal, and avoidance of many
constitutional concerns. Furthermore, the law favors charitable donations
because of the benefit to society that they produce. Finally, this particular
proposal provides the plaintiff compensation for the services she provides in
pursuing punitive damages from egregious wrongdoers.
This charitable donation proposal would adequately compensate the victim.
Unlike some approaches to non-pecuniary awards, this proposed charitable
donation approach does not affect the amount of compensatory damages a
plaintiff can recover, including amounts for pain and suffering. 163
Proposals to limit the amount of pain and suffering damages recoverable
circumvent the purpose of the tort system: compensation for injuries caused. 164
For example, in Taylor v. Medenica, M.D., 165 a doctor who was the sole
stockholder of a medical laboratory treated the plaintiff for breast cancer with
a drug that no medical expert recognized as standard care. Indeed, the doctor
himself had written an article on the treatment of breast cancer and had not
mentioned the drug prescribed. The plaintiff's condition worsened, and the
doctor ordered-through his own laboratory-"excessive," "bizarre," and
"questionable" tests, which the court concluded were "conducted for the
purpose of generating income." The woman subsequently died, and the jury
awarded to her estate and her husband four million dollars in compensatory
damages and ten million dollars in punitive damages. The jury acted
reasonably. However, if the woman had lived in Michigan, for example, the
state would have limited her estate and her husband to a recovery of $225,000
for non-economic losses, including pain and suffering.166 This proposal would
not limit the plaintiff to an arbitrarily determined amount of pain and suffering
damages because that limit would frustrate the goal of adequate
167
compensation.
Unlike statutory cap jurisdictions, 168 the charitable donation alternative
fully punishes and deters egregious wrongdoers. Large and wealthy health
care organizations with the potential for inflicting the most harm are primary
beneficiaries of upper limits on punitive damages. Moreover, they are best able

163

See statutes cited supra note 34.

164

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ToRTs § 901 (a) (1979).
165479 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1996).
166

MICH. COmp LAWS § 600.1583 (1986).

167

See McCoRMIcK, supra note 47.

168

See statutes cited supra note 34.
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to bear the cost of such damages. Statutory caps create the unfortunate situation
of least-deterring those tort-feasors who require the most deterrence. Much like
the split-statute jurisdictions, 169 this charitable donation proposal avoids that
problem. This proposal does not restrict the assessment of an amount of
damages necessary to adequately deter future wrongful conduct-whatever
that amount might be.
Another advantage of this charitable donation proposal is that it would
prevent "windfall" awards to plaintiffs and temper the inflated incentive to
pursue punitive damages that currently exist. Unlike the tradition of allowing
the plaintiff to recover the full amount of a punitive damage award, this
proposal limits the plaintiff's recovery of punitive damages to an amount that
compensates him for his service to the public. Much like split statutes, this
proposal reduces-without eliminating-the incentive for plaintiffs to pursue
punitive damages.
Unlike split statutes, however, charitable donations of punitive damages
avoid many of the constitutional problems associated with government
interests in civil damage awards and provide political appeal for those who call
for smaller government. Under this plan, the government has no claim to any
portion of the punitive damage award. The entire amount passes to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney, and the private organization or trust approved
by the court.
Charitable donations enjoy an advantage that no other approach to punitive
damages can claim: charitable donations serve the public good. 170 "It is well
recognized that charitable gifts are favored by the law and by the courts. Courts
will give effect to charitable gifts where it is possible to do so consistent with
recognized rules of law."171 True, courts understand that punitive damages
serve an important social purpose, but courts see the problems inherent in
awarding large punitive awards to a single plaintiff or a state entity. Charitable
donations present a different scenario. Instead of questioning the possible
abuse by government in pursuing punitive damages in split-statute
jurisdictions, or questioning the motive of plaintiffs in common law states,
courts in these proposed charitable donation jurisdictions can more
comfortably embrace awards of punitive damages. Courts do not need to be as
skeptical of the motives of those plaintiffs who pursue punitive damages.
The law shows this high regard for charitable donations in the areas of tax
law and the law of trusts. The Internal Revenue Code states that "[t]here shall
be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution.., payment of which is

169

See statutes cited supra note 35.

17014 C.J.S., Charities § 2 (a) (1979). "In its legal sense, a charity may be broadly defined

as a gift for general public use; in its ordinary sense, the term 'charity' is employed as
meaning benevolence, philanthropy, or goodwill or relief or alms to the poor." Id.
171Mercy Hosp. of Williston v. Stillwell, 358 N.W.2d 506, 509 (N.D. 1984) (citations
omitted).
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made within the taxable year."172 Congress shows the importance of charitable
donations by the broad definition it gives to deductible charitable donations:
"[Subject to other limitations, a taxpayer may deduct from taxable income] any
gift to or for the use of... [a] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or
foundation . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,

173
scientific, literary, or educational purposes.
Courts realize the limitation of government in meeting certain social needs.

The Court in Bob Jones University v. United States1 74 noted that "Congress sought

to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the
development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose to
175
Tax
supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind."
breaks for charitable organizations "aid in the accomplishment of many social
goals which our federal and local governments otherwise cannot or will not
accomplish."1

76

The law of trusts also has a long history of favoring charitable application of
resources.
A charitable trust is often said to have certain advantages over the
private trust. (1) Charitable trusts are not subject to the rule requiring
definite beneficiaries ....

(2) Charitable trusts may last in perpetuity,

whereas a private trust in perpetuity would run afoul of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. .

.

. (3) While private express trusts can

accumulate income for only a definite period, income under charitable
trusts may be accumulated for the period necessary to accomplish its
purpose.... (4) [C]y pres 1 7 7 prevents termination of a charitable trust

under circumstances which might terminate a private express trust....
(5) Under the older decisions trust funds for charity cannot be reached
for torts committed by the trustee .... 178

172 1.R.C. § 170 (a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
173 1.R.C. § 170 (c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1996); see also I.R.C. § 642 (c) (West Supp. 1996):
"Deduction for Amounts Paid or Permanently Set Aside for a Charitable Purpose." But
see, Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: Who Shouild
Ultimately Bearthe Burdenfor CorporateMisconduct?,47 ALA. L. REV. 825. Ms. Pace argues
that the Internal Revenue Code contains corporate loopholes that encourage "flagrant
indifference to the safety of others." Id. at 826.
174461 U.S. 574 (1983).
175 Id. at 588.
176 Bizinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1986) (Hill, J., dissenting).
177
See infra, notes 188-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of cy
pres in medical malpractice punitive damages.
178 JoHN RrrCHIE, ET AL, DEcEDENTs' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 705-06 (8th ed. 1993).
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English chancellors enforced charitable donations to indefinite beneficiaries
even before the Statute of Uses 179 was enacted in 1601.180
The basis for this favored status of charitable trusts lies in the public benefit
they provide. 181 The Restatement of Trusts lists six types of trusts that provide
enough public good to warrant the above advantages. 182 The respective
purposes are "(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of education; (c) the
advancement of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) governmental or
municipal purposes; and (f) other purposes the accomplishment of which is
beneficial to the community."183 Courts will go to great lengths to interpret
language as falling within these broad classes of charitable trusts. For example,
in In re Jordan'sEstate,184 the court held that a will leaving property simply "for
charity" was sufficiently definite to establish a charitable trust, despite the lack
of directions specifying a specific recipient of the property.185 When a trust
specifically identifies the promotion of health as its purpose, courts show an
even greater propensity to give it effect. For example, in In re Tomlinsons's
Estate,186 the court noted the special public interest in protecting testatrix'
1 87
donation of one-third of her estate to the American Cancer Society.
188
Application of the cy pres doctrine
provides charitable trusts with the
greatest potential for providing the general public the benefits of punitive
damage awards. Courts apply the cy pres doctrine when a charitable trust
becomes obsolete, when the beneficiary of a charitable trust ceases to exist, or
189
when the purpose of the charitable trust has been fulfilled.
190
The 1867 case of Jackson v. Phillips shows the power of this doctrine. In
Jackson, the testator left $10,000 to William Lloyd Garrison and others in trust
"for them to use and expend at their discretion ... such [ ] means, as, in their
judgment, will create a public sentiment that will put an end to Negro slavery

17943 Ed.2 I, c. 4 (1601).
18

18

OSee RrrCl-HE ET AL., supra note 178, at 704.

1RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 360 (1957).

182

1d.

183

1d. at § 368. "A fiduciary relationship with regard to property is a result of a
manifestation of intent to create such a relationship subjecting the owner to equitable
duties to manage property for a charitable purpose." Id.
184197 A. 150 (Pa. 1938).
185

1d.

186245 Cal. App. 2d 793 (1966).
187 1d. at 795.
188
189

See WrLIAM F. FRATcHER, SCOTr ON TRUSTS § 395 (4th ed. 1989).
1d. at § 360.

19096 Mass. (14 Allen) 539.

1997-98]

'TIS BETTER TO GIVE THAN TO RECEIVE

in this country."19 1 The testator died in 1861, and after the Civil War the
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. 192 The testator's heirs claimed that
since slavery had ended, the charitable trust's purpose had ended and the
money should have been dispersed to the heirs. The court disagreed:
Neither the immediate purpose of the testator-the moral education
of the people; nor his ultimate object-to better the condition of the
African race in this country; has been fully accomplished by the
abolition of slavery..., the Negroes, although emancipated, still stand
in great need of assistance and education. Charities for the poor have
held to be well applied to educate them and their
been often
19 3
children.
The importance of this doctrine in the context of charitable donations of
medical malpractice punitive damages is that future medical advances will not
destroy the public benefit of the punitive damage. For example, the March of
Dimes originally intended to fund research and treatment for polio. Once
medical researchers found a cure for polio, the March of Dimes did not
disappear. Rather, funds originally intended for polio research now continue
to fund research for other childhood diseases.
The potential of this plan for improvement of health care is limited only by
the creativity of the plaintiffs who designate the future use of the funds. This
author cannot possibly formulate the best uses of punitive damages in any
particular situation. Each case differs, and the victim of medical malpractice
occupies the unique position of having firsthand knowledge of the suffering
involved in an egregious wrong. These victims have the best claims to the
privilege to designate the recipient. The author can only offer charitable
donations as an alternative solution and illustrations of its possible application.
For example, in Kavanaugh, M.D. v. Perkins,194 the plaintiff sought punitive
damages from the doctor for her husband's death because she alleged that,
while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, the doctor had performed
surgery on her husband. 195 In such a case, the plaintiff might best serve the
public by donating the punitive damages to Alcoholics Anonymous. The
plaintiff might also donate the punitive damages to a medical hotline service
that helps doctors with this type of problem. The plaintiff might believe the
best solution to the problem lies in physician education. Thus, the plaintiff
might donate the punitive damages to the medical licensing board's substance
abuse program. All of these scenarios present a better solution than allowing
the plaintiff to keep the entire award.

191 id.at 539.
192Id.
193

1d. at 540.

194838 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
195

1d. at 619.
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In Seifert v. Burroughs,196 the parents of a ten-year-old girl sought
compensatory and punitive damages from the doctor who misdiagnosed her
appendicitis as gastritis and then failed to obtain informed consent for two
surgeries prior to her death. A plaintiff in this situation has several viable
recipients of recovered punitive damages. For example, the parents could
donate the funds to a citizen watchdog group that tracks negligent doctors.
Indeed, recent citizens' groups have begun intemet web sites precisely for this
purpose. 197 Administration of this web site requires money, and the plaintiffs
might decide that this type of effort to inform patients deserves support.
In Rossi v. Estate of Almorez, 198 the HIV-positive plaintiff sought punitive
damages from the estate of the doctor who operated on her without informed
consent. She claimed that the late doctor knew that he had AIDS and that he
gave her the disease.199 Countless possible recipients of punitive damages in
an AIDS case exist. Most obviously, the plaintiff could donate the funds to AIDS
research. The plaintiff might simply place the funds in trust for future AIDS
victims who lack medical insurance. The plaintiff might also like to help future
victims of malpractice who cannot collect from an insolvent health care
provider. The possibilities do not end.
Finally, in Stone v. Foster,M.D., 200 the plaintiff sued her doctor for punitive
damages as a result of a grossly negligent "tummy tuck.' 20 1 A plaintiff in this
situation might donate the punitive damages to a non-profit weight-loss center
or to a school system's health department that teaches children the virtues of
exercise and a balanced diet.
The author simply points out that, just as limitless as the situations that can
give rise to punitive damages, so, too, are the possible future benefits to health
care. Charitable donations provide an answer to the punitive damage problem
in medical malpractice actions.
V. CONCLUSION
202

In Oberg,
the plaintiff's attorney asked the jury in closing arguments to
hold the defendant responsible for outrageous wrongs inflicted upon 1000
people: "That's wrong, ladies and gentlemen. They ought not be permitted to

196526 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1988).
19 7Massachusetts Miracle, PEOPLE'S MED. SOC'Y NEWSL., Oct. 1996, at p. 4 . Under
pressure from citizen information advocates, Massachusetts became the first state to
post malpractice settlements and hospital and medical board disciplinary actions on the
internet. Id.
198
No. 90344028, 1991 WL 166924 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991).
1991d.
200106 Cal. App. 3d 334 (1980).

201Id.
202116 S. Ct. 1589.
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keep that. You should do something about it.' 203 This author
agrees-especially when the defendant commits outrageous wrongs involving
an individual's personal health. However, that "something" to which the
attorney referred should not include the traditional approaches to punitive
damages: The law should not allow the complete medical malpractice punitive
damage award to go directly to the plaintiff; the law should not arbitrarily limit
health care providers' liability at a fixed maximum; and the law should not
provide the state with the opportunity to abuse its "prosecutorial powers" that
inevitably occurs when it has an interest in punitive damages.
Instead, cases involving outrageous medical malpractice should incorporate
a solution that avoids the problems of the current approaches, holds a favored
position in the law, prevents the existence of many future victims, and
efficiently converts the misfortunes of current malpractice victims into benefits
for the greatest number of victims in the future. In other words, the law should
utilize the benefits of charitable donations of punitive donations in medical
malpractice cases.
NICHOLAS M. MILLER

2031995 WL 126508 (U.S. Ala. Pet. Brief) at 31.
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